(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client unless:

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and

(2) each client consents after a full disclosure of the circumstances and consultation with the client, except that a public entity cannot consent to any such representation.

(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and

(2) the client consents after a full disclosure of the circumstances and consultation with the client, except that a public entity cannot consent to any such representation. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.

(c) This rule shall not alter the effect of case law or ethics opinions to the effect that:

(1) in certain cases or categories of cases involving conflicts or apparent conflicts, consent to continued representation is immaterial, and

(2) in certain cases or situations creating an appearance of impropriety rather than an actual conflict, multiple representation is not permissible, that is, in those situations in which an ordinary knowledgeable citizen acquainted with the facts would conclude that the multiple representation poses substantial risk of disservice to either the public interest or the interest of one of the clients.

Comment to RPC 1.7

The Court has revised subparagraphs (a)(2) and (b)(2) of the recommendation of the Debevoise Committee so as to preserve New Jersey's rule that a government agency cannot consent to representation if a conflict of interest exists or if the appearance of such a conflict exists. Thus, if there is a conflict that can only be cured by consent and if a governmental entity is one of the parties that must consent, that conflict cannot be avoided and representation of one or more of the clients must be terminated.

The Court has added a paragraph (e) that preserves the effect of New Jersey case law and ethics opinions to the effect that consent to representation or continued representation is immaterial in certain cases or categories of cases when faced with conflicts or apparent conflicts. See, e.g., State v. Bellucci, 81 N.J. 531 (1980) (criminal codefendants; potential for conflict of interest required reversal of convictions and retrial); State v. Land, 73 N.J. 24 (1977) -(same)-, In re Cohn, 46 N.J. 202, 211-13 (1966) (improper here for attorney to accept retainer from client who was to be main witness in pending matter against another of his clients). In these cases in which consent will permit continued representation despite a conflict of interest, it must be an informed consent based on a "full and timely" disclosure of the conflict. In re Dolan, 76 N.J. 1, 8-13 (1978); In re Kamp, 40 N.J. 588, 595-96 (1963); see also In re Nichols, 95 N.J. 126, 131 (1984) (transactions between attorney and client); In re Gavel, 22 N.J. 248,262 (1956) (same).

The Court has also included language in new paragraph (e) so as expressly to preserve in New Jersey the "appearance of impropriety" rule. See, e.g., In re Garber, 95 N.J. 597, 609-10 (1984); Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 470 (1980); Perillo v. Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, 83 N.J. 366, 373 (1980); Higgins v. Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, 73 N.J. 123, 128-29 (1977). That "appearance" rule "is intended to instill public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession." In re Opinion No. 415, 81 N.J. 318, 323 (1979); see id. at 323-24.

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