|
PLANNING FOR DIVORCE
THOUGHTS ON ESTATE PLANNING WHEN THE HONEYMOON IS OVER ---
AND AFTER THE DIVORCE
by Patricia M. Barbarito, Esq. and Gary R. Botwinick, Esq.
As difficult as it is to accept (even for divorce lawyers)- the reality is that the divorce business is booming - divorce has become an accepted way of life.
Despite the fact that we, as matrimonial attorneys, make our living ending
people's marriages - there is something inherently disturbing about the thought
of a divorce entering the mind-set of the happy couple before wedding day. It
is even more disturbing to accept that people think about divorce while they
are living together as husband and wife, without telling their spouse. But
people do think of these things-- prenuptial agreements are part of our practice,
and are enforceable (1). An agreement negotiated during the marriage may even be enforceable. (2) An agreement that induces reconciliation in a substantially deteriorated marital relationship will be enforced if fair and equitable. (3) And, of course, property settlement agreements, negotiated and entered into at the end of a marriage in contemplation of divorce are enforceable. (4)
For all practical purposes, the negotiating and signing of a
premarital agreement (if done properly) settles the terms of the divorce before
the wedding day. A mid-marriage agreement may resolve the parties' financial
issues. A reconciliation agreement made in good faith, that is fair and
reasonable, and that resuscitates a dying marriage, sets forth clearly the
conditions entered into for the marriage to continue. The property settlement
agreement is made while technically in the adversarial mode -- each party
participating in the negotiations, resolving issues relating to the end of their
marriage. All documents are up front -- both parties participating in their fate.
But the idea of secretly planning for a possible divorce -- well that sends chills
up even the most cynical of us -- it's just plain "creepy".
Is a divorce something that can, or should, be planned for "privately" -- before one's spouse realizes the end is near? Should married people evaluate
their situation vis-a-vis the death of their spouse, versus their situation after a
divorce? Perhaps these considerations while pretending to be in a "good"
marriage are a bit duplicitous -- but it is naive to suggest that it doesn't
happen, or shouldn't be done.
I. AFTER THE HONEYMOON IS OVER-- BUT BEFORE YOU LET YOUR
SPOUSE IN ON THE SECRET
A. Issues to Address Prior to the Filing of a Divorce Complaint
1. Life Insurance - Upon the death of a decedent, the proceeds of a
life insurance policy will be paid to the designated beneficiary of the life
insurance policy. As a general rule, so long as the insured is also the owner of
the life insurance policy (which is the common scenario) the insured can select
and/or change the beneficiary. Of course, this change is not irrevocable and
can be changed by the insured at any time while the insured is also the owner
of the policy. Nevertheless, New Jersey Court Rule 5:4-2(f) provides that the
first pleading in the divorce action must include an affidavit of insurance
coverage which must specify whether any insurance coverage was modified
within the 90-day period preceding the complaint. (5) If a party intends to change
the beneficiary of a life insurance policy away from a soon-to-be-ex-spouse, the
beneficiary should be changed more than 90 days prior to the filing of the
complaint.
What must be evaluated by the matrimonial attorney, is the need to file a
complaint for divorce, versus the need to "buy time" in order to change the
beneficiary. For example, if your client is being denied access to the children,
waiting to file a complaint for divorce may not be an option. Candidly, it is
questionable as to whether or not a Court would require a change back to the
"status quo," even if the beneficiary designation was modified more than 90
days prior to the filing of the first pleading. In any event, you must discuss this
Rule and time-line with every new client so as to evaluate a strategic approach
to the case.
Also be aware of the consequences in a situation when a spouse is
changing the beneficiary of the life insurance policy and the new beneficiary
will be a minor child. If in fact the intention is that the minor child receive the
proceeds, it is often wise to designate a trust as the beneficiary to receive
these proceeds for the child. This trust will usually provide that the principal
and/or income of the trust will be used for the exclusive benefit of the child in
the discretion of a third-party trustee. In the absence of such a direction, the
soon-to-be-ex-spouse will likely be appointed guardian of the property of the
child and have access and/or control over those proceeds. The trustee of the
trust need not be the child's surviving parent. The trust may provide that the
trustee may, or may not, consider the support which a parent is required to
give to a child. The trustee may also have broad discretion in determining the
form of distributions and the timing of these distributions. Holding these
monies in trust provides protection from the child's creditors and provides for
their disposition in the event of the death of the child before the assets are fully
distributed. (6)
2. Powers of Attorney - Often during the course of a marriage,
spouses will execute powers of attorney in favor of each other. Normally, these
powers of attorney are "general" powers of attorney granting each other
complete control over the assets of the marriage and the assets of the
individual granting the power. (7)
If a wife gives a husband a general power of attorney, the husband can
use this power to access the wife's individual bank accounts, brokerage
accounts, etc. Obviously, this can be quite dangerous. Unfortunately, the only
way to revoke a power of attorney is to locate all of the originals and destroy
them or notify all of the institutions in possession of such powers and inform
them that they have been revoked. (8) Using a power of attorney is a powerful and dangerous tool if in the wrong person's hands. Imagine the damage a
devious husband or wife could do to an unsuspecting spouse's financial
security . While in all likelihood if the sinister plot is revealed during the
divorce proceeding a Court would or should impose sanctions, or at the very
least remedy the situation, the reality is that once the money is gone -- it's
gone! Hopefully, assets exist to be awarded to the duped spouse. If not, the
result could be disastrous. If the soon-to-be-ex-spouse has the powers in his or
her possession, it would be a good idea to notify all institutions having
accounts owned by the principal, in writing, that these powers have been
revoked. Obviously, this may "red flag" the intention of the notifying spouse
that the divorce is in the future -- again, your client should simply know his or
her options.
3. Individual Retirement Accounts - Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRA) are as popular today as ever before. With people moving from job to job
and company to company, 401(k) plans and other qualified benefit plans are
usually rolled-over into IRAs. Often, they are one of the largest assets of an
estate, sometimes exceeding $1,000,000 in value.
The disposition of an IRA is governed by a beneficiary designation form.
Upon the death of the owner of the IRA, the value of the account will be
payable to the beneficiary. Normally, a spouse will designate a surviving
spouse as the beneficiary of the IRA. This often makes sense for income tax
planning purposes as a surviving spouse can rollover an IRA into his or her
own name and continue to defer recognition of income until the surviving
spouse attains the age of 70½. (9)
Nevertheless, in cases where significant animosity exists between the
spouses, and a divorce is contemplated, the owner of the IRA may wish to
change the beneficiary to anyone other than the soon-to-be-ex-spouse. While
this may accelerate the income tax recognition (e.g. the distribution of the
proceeds must commence within one year after the death of the owner) (10), the owner will be assured that the proceeds will not belong to the surviving
spouse. Contrary to popular opinion, making this change without spousal
approval is not prohibited, as IRAs are not covered by ERISA. However, a
similar change cannot be made with ordinary employer-sponsored qualified
retirement plans as they are subject to ERISA and REA. (11)
4. Gifts and the Establishment of Trusts to Protect Assets From
Dissipation-and Ultimately From Equitable Distribution. Of course, we know
that assets acquired during the marriage are subject to equitable distribution,
regardless of the party to whom these assets may be titled. (12) But, what happens if the assets no longer belong to the spouse or spouses? What
happens if one spouse unilaterally gives the assets away during the marriage,
unbeknownst to the other spouse? What happens if the spouse makes such a
gift for what may very well be legitimate and well-intentioned purposes? What
if the spouse unilaterally dissipates the assets for a legitimate purpose to
prevent the other spouse from irretrievably dissipating them for an illegitimate
purpose?
We are well aware of the Court's disapproval of unilateral dissipations of
monies. In Monte v. Monte, (13) the Court held that the "intentional dissipation" of
assets by one party "is no more than a fraud on marital rights" to the detriment
of the other spouse. (14) The Court thus held that such dissipation is chargeable to the dissipating spouse. Further, among the factors considered in making
equitable distribution of property is the "contribution of each party to the . . .
dissipation . . . in the amount or value of the marital property . . .." (15)
However, assume the husband in a marriage is an alcoholic who refuses
to receive treatment, refuses to work, and has a tendency to incur debt for
unreasonable purposes. He drives an automobile while intoxicated, exposing
himself to unimaginable liabilities. The wife works hard, has built a business
of her own, and has amassed individually titled assets, which would be subject
to equitable distribution. The marriage has disintegrated, but the spouses are
still living together for the sake of their minor children. The wife is concerned
about preserving the wealth which she (or they) has amassed. They have
children to support and educate, and it is clear to her that she will continue to
have that financial responsibility . She establishes an irrevocable trust for the
benefit of their three children and begins to make sizable contributions to the
trust, without the consent or knowledge of her husband. These contributions
go on for a period of three years and total $90,000. (16) The wife, after feeling confident that her hard earned money is "protected" as a result of the funding of
this trust, files a complaint for divorce. Can the husband claim that these
assets were unilaterally dissipated and should, therefore, be charged against
the wife's share of equitable distribution?
In Kothari v. Kothari, (17) the husband, an immigrant from India, sent large sums of money to his parents in India in accordance with Indian custom. The trial court held that the wife was entitled to equitable distribution equal to one-half of the monies sent to the husband's parents. Considering whether the
husband "dissipated" the assets, the Court noted that the Legislature, when
adopting N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:34-23.1(i), did not define the word "dissipation."
The Court stated that "[i]t is clear, however, that the concept is a plastic one,
suited to fit the demands of the individual case." (18) The Court cited the following factors in making a determination that the husband unilaterally
dissipated marital assets:
1. The proximity of the expenditure to the parties' separation.
2. Whether the expenditure was typical of expenditures made by the
parties prior to the breakdown of the marriage.
3. Whether the expenditure benefitted the joint marital enterprise or
was for the benefit of one spouse to the exclusion of the other.
4. The need for, and amount of, the expenditure. (19)
In our fact pattern referred to above, assume that the trust established
by the wife directed that the funds be used to fund the higher education of the
children. While the trust may have been established by the wife in relatively
close proximity to the end of the parties' marriage, planning for the future of
children is generally a "typical" expense, and certainly benefits the overall
"marital enterprise". No one could argue that there is not a "need" for the
expense. Could not a convincing argument be made that the husband should
not receive credit for these monies when determining equitable distribution?
5. Review of Shareholder Agreements or Buy/Sell Agreements -
Occasionally, when two or more people are in business together, they will
enter into a shareholder agreement which provides that if one of the
shareholders or partners is involved in a divorce proceeding, the other
shareholders or partners have the right to buy the interest of the divorcing
shareholder. Thus, any such agreement should be carefully reviewed and
analyzed to quantify any possible risks before a complaint is filed. If there are
significant negative consequences that will ensue if a complaint for divorce is
filed, a renegotiation of the agreement might be warranted. Certainly, if the
filing of the complaint for divorce might bring undesired results with respect to
the complainant's livelihood, he or she may wish to consider other alternatives.
What is the relationship which the spouse seeking the divorce has with his or
her partners? How might they react? Will they hold your client's feet to the
fire? Is such an agreement even enforceable? Careful consideration must be
paid to the consequences of these agreements.
B. The Big Question - Does Your Client File a Complaint for
Divorce, or Wait and See if Their Spouse Dies?
1. Is The Spouse Better Off Divorced Or As A Surviving Spouse - A
surviving spouse has certain rights that a divorced spouse does not possess.
A. Elective Share - N.J. Stat. Ann. §3B:8-1 provides that even
if a spouse is disinherited in a will, that surviving spouse may be entitled to an
"Elective Share." An Elective Share is generally one-third of the "Augmented
Estate." However, an Elective Share can only be obtained if "at the time of
death the decedent and the surviving spouse had not been living separate and
apart in different habitations or had not ceased to cohabit as man and wife,
either as a result of judgment of divorce from bed and board or under
circumstances which would have given rise to a cause of action for divorce or
nullity of marriage." (20)
Therefore, a determination must be made as to whether a spouse
seeking a divorce would be better off as a widow (or widower) or as a divorcee.
This will require an analysis of the assets of the family and the individual
spouses, as well as an analysis of the anticipated result in a divorce
proceeding.
B. How is the "Augmented Estate" computed? The
Augmented Estate is computed as follows:
The Probate Estate
Reduced by: (i) Funeral and administration expenses
(ii) Enforceable claims against the estate
Increased by: (i) Transfers after May 28, 1980, to a person other
than the spouse, for less than full
consideration, where the decedent retained
certain powers or rights over such property;
(ii) Transfers made within two years of death of
the decedent, where the aggregate transfers
to any one donee in either year exceeded
$3000;
(iii) The value of property owned by a surviving
spouse at, or as a result of, the decedent's
death to the extent that the property was
derived from the decedent by other than
testate or intestate succession without full
consideration;
(iv) The value of property described in (iii) above
which was transferred by the surviving
spouse during the marriage, without full
consideration, to a person other than the
decedent and which would have been
included in the spouse's Augmented Estate if
the surviving spouse predeceased the
decedent. (21)
C. Certain items excluded from Augmented Estate. The
following items are excluded from the Augmented Estate:
(i) Life and accident insurance, payable to a person other than
the surviving spouse;
(ii) A joint annuity or pension, payable to a person other than
the surviving spouse; and
(iii) A transfer of property if made with the written consent or
joinder of the surviving spouse. (22)
D. How is the Elective Share satisfied? New Jersey's Elective
Share statute is unique from other states in one very significant way; New
Jersey's Elective Share is based upon need. The Elective Share is first satisfied
out of the surviving spouse's independent wealth and out of decedent's
bequests and non-probate transfers to him or her. (23) Thus, if the surviving spouse's own independent assets exceed one-third of the value of the
Augmented Estate, the surviving spouse is not entitled to an elective share.
E. Analysis. When you are trying to determine whether it is in
your client's best interests to seek a divorce or stay married, you must carefully
analyze the anticipated results in both scenarios. If a client thinks that they
will benefit financially on the spouse's death, they must understand that, at
best, all they will be entitled to is a combination of (i) the elective share (if any),
(ii) jointly owned assets with rights of survivorship (net of attendant liabilities),
and (iii) certain other assets which they have a legally protected right to
receive (i.e. ERISA qualified benefits, as discussed above). In some cases,
these death benefits may exceed what the spouse might be entitled to in a
divorce action. However, in some cases, they might be better off divorcing the
spouse and quantifying each parties' respective rights.
C. Use of Applicable Exclusion Amount or Annual Exclusion of
Both Spouses
Each U.S. citizen or resident is entitled to pass $675,000 of wealth
to any other person or persons during their lifetime, or upon their death (in the
aggregate), without the imposition of federal estate or gift taxes. (24) Thus, a
husband and wife together can transfer $1,350,000 without the imposition of a
tax. The Internal Revenue Code further provides that a gift from one spouse
can be treated as made one-half (1/2) from each spouse if an appropriate
election is made and the spouses are married to each other at the time of the
gift and the non-contributing spouse does not remarry during the year of the
gift. (25) Should you counsel your client to stay in the marriage long enough to utilize the credit of the other spouse which otherwise might be wasted?
Example: Herman is married to Wilma but is considering filing a
complaint for divorce. Herman has children from a prior marriage and Wilma
has no children. Herman has wealth of about $5,000,000 consisting
predominantly of a closely held business, most of which is not subject to
equitable distribution. Wilma has insignificant assets and is unlikely to receive
any significant assets after the divorce. Herman wishes to make gifts of
minority interests in his business to his children worth $1,200,000. However,
Herman will have to pay a gift tax for transfers to the extent they exceed
$675,000. With Wilma's consent, however, Herman can "split the gifts" and take
advantage of Wilma's $675,000 credit which otherwise might be wasted. Thus,
this will permit Herman to transfer $1,350,000 of value to his children without
the imposition of a gift tax.
In addition to the $675,000 credit discussed above, each individual is
entitled to make annual gifts of $10,000 to any other individual without being
subject to federal gift tax. (26) Moreover, these so-called "annual exclusion" gifts do not reduce the $675,000 credit otherwise available to each U.S. citizen or
resident. As discussed above, 26 U.S.C. §2513 permits a married couple to treat
any gift made by one spouse as made one-half by each spouse. Thus, prior to a
divorce, a spouse can double the annual exclusion gifts he or she could
otherwise make if the soon-to-be-ex-spouse consents.
The ability to utilize the $675,000 credit belonging to the soon-to-be-ex-spouse, and his or her annual exclusion gift rights, can have significant value.
Thus, a spouse anticipating a divorce may wish to consider delaying the filing
of a complaint to utilize this opportunity. Likewise, for the spouse whose
credits will be utilized not for his or her benefit, this may provide a significant
bargaining chip in a divorce action, as this credit may have significantly more
value to the other spouse, which he or she may be willing to pay for with a
larger share of equitable distribution.
II. AFTER THE SECRET IS OUT & THE COMPLAINT IS FILED --
NOW WHAT?
ISSUES TO ADDRESS DURING THE DIVORCE PROCEEDING
A. Preparing and Executing a New Last Will and Testament - N.J.
Stat. Ann. §3B:3-14 provides that "if after having executed a will the testator is
divorced or his marriage annulled, the divorce or annulment revokes any
dispositions or appointment of property made by the will to the former spouse,
any provision conferring a general or special power of appointment on the
former spouse, and any nomination of the former spouse as executor, trustee, or
guardian, unless the will expressly provides otherwise." (Emphasis added).
Unfortunately, the provisions of N.J. Stat. Ann. §3B:3-14 only apply in the event
of divorce. Therefore, during the pendency of a divorce proceeding, any
provisions in a will for the benefit of a spouse, or appointing a spouse as a
fiduciary, will be enforceable in the event that the testator should die before a
judgment of divorce is issued.
Because of the possibility of death during the pendency of divorce, it is
imperative that a review of any existing wills occurs to determine if changes
are necessary. Generally, if a soon-to-be-ex-spouse is going to be disinherited
under a will, the will should specify that the testator has intentionally made no
provision for the spouse.
B. What happens if an individual dies during a divorce proceeding
without a will? In this situation, the surviving spouse will be entitled to an
intestate share of the estate. (27) In the event of intestacy, N.J. Stat. Ann. §3B:5-3
provides that a surviving spouse will be entitled to the following:
(i) If there is no surviving issue or parent of the
decedent, the surviving spouse receives the entire estate;
(ii) If there is no surviving issue but the decedent is
survived by a parent or parents, the surviving spouse receives the first $50,000,
plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate;
(iii) If there are surviving issue, all of whom are issue of
the surviving spouse also, the surviving spouse receives the first $50,000, plus
one-half of the balance of the intestate estate;
(iv) If there are surviving issue, one or more of whom are
not issue of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse receives one-half of the
intestate estate.
C. What claim does a surviving spouse have against an estate of a
deceased spouse who has disinherited the surviving spouse during the
pendency of a divorce?
In Carr v. Carr, (28) the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed this very
issue. During the pendency of divorce proceedings initiated by a wife, her
estranged husband died and left his entire estate to his children from a prior
marriage. Mrs. Carr filed an order to show cause to substitute the executor of
the husband's estate as a defendant, to restrain the disposition of the
decedent's estate, to continue pendente lite support payments, and requesting
a hearing to resolve the issues of alimony, equitable distribution, and legal
fees. The trial court held that the divorce action and claims for alimony and
equitable distribution were terminated by Mr. Carr's death, and discontinued
Mrs. Carr's pendente lite support. However, the Court permitted Mrs. Carr to
amend her complaint to seek equitable remedies, which she did. Mrs. Carr also
appealed the trial court's dismissal of the alimony and equitable distribution
claims. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the trial court's opinion. (29)
A petition for certification was granted. (30)
Our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's determination that the
equitable distribution statute does not authorize the distribution of marital
assets except upon divorce of the parties. (31) Since Mr. Carr died prior to a judgment of divorce, equitable distribution was not authorized. However, Mrs.
Carr was likewise not entitled to a claim for an elective share because she and
Mr. Carr were no longer living together. (32) This placed Mrs. Carr in a so-called "black hole." (33) She had no right to equitable distribution and no right to an elective share. Nevertheless, the Court held that Mrs. Carr is entitled to some form of equitable relief and the equitable remedy of constructive trust should
be imposed upon the marital property under the control of the executor of Mr.
Carr's estate. (34) Thus, the Court fashioned a remedy to provide treatment similar to equitable distribution for the benefit of Mrs. Carr.
D. Issues to Address in New Will. The new will should address the
manner in which assets are going to be held for any minor children. It is
generally undesirable to leave any bequest to a minor child outright in a will if
the decedent intends to protect the bequest from the minor child's other parent.
Thus, an outright bequest (i.e. in a residuary clause of a will) to a minor child
might endanger these funds if the other parent (the ex-spouse of the decedent)
is irresponsible or incapable of managing such money. Generally, the testator
should consider naming a third party to act as the trustee of such bequest until
the child attains a specified age. This arrangement will protect the assets from
the reach of the child's parent.
Additionally, a new will may name new guardians of any minor children,
as well as a new executor of the estate. Though, as a general rule, a surviving
parent is normally appointed as the custodian when the custodial parent
predeceases, N.J. Stat. Ann. §9:2-5 provides that the Court has discretion to
order otherwise. (35) Therefore, if a client has significant concerns regarding the surviving parent of the child, he or she may wish to provide for the
appointment of another person as the guardian of the child or children after his
or her death. While this will not be binding upon the Court, it should at least
carry some weight for the benefit of the guardian appointed in the deceased
parent's will.
E. Should the Surviving Spouse Simply be Disinherited in the Will?
While the testator may often wish to disinherit the surviving spouse, to do so
may result in negative tax consequences to the children of the marriage who
will be the ultimate beneficiaries. As stated above, an omitted spouse may be
entitled to an elective share from the estate. (36) In the absence of any direction to the contrary in a will, if a surviving spouse is successful in asserting a claim
for an elective share, such spouse will receive 1/3 of the augmented estate.
The spouse will receive this elective share free of any obligation to leave such
money to any other person. Thus, for example, if a husband receives an
elective share upon the death of his spouse, there is no prohibition upon him
transferring these assets during his lifetime or upon his death to anyone other
than the children of the marriage.
Furthermore, if a spouse is disinherited from a will, there will be an
increased tax liability upon the death of the first spouse as there will not be
any marital deduction available. (37)
Assuming the entire estate is thus payable to the children of the
decedent, any amounts in excess of $675,000 will be subject to estate tax upon
the decedent's death. Through the use of an estate planning concept known as
a QTIP Trust (an acronym for Qualified Terminable Interest Property), (38) the children may receive a greater benefit from the combined estate of both
spouses. A QTIP Trust must provide that the surviving spouse is entitled to a
life estate in the principal of the trust, and the beneficiaries designated by the
spouse under whose will the trust is established, will receive the remainder of
the trust. (39) This technique results in the deferral of estate taxes as the value of the QTIP Trust will be included in the taxable estate of the surviving spouse
upon his or her death. However, this does permit such amounts to avoid
taxation on the death of the first spouse.
Unfortunately, in order to take advantage of such a technique, the
surviving spouse must be entitled to all of the income from the QTIP Trust
during his or her lifetime (40), and the trust must be funded with at least 2/3 of the augmented estate (rather than 1/3 of the augmented estate), otherwise the
surviving spouse may still be entitled to an additional distribution pursuant to
the elective share statutes. (41)
F. Estate Planning for the Parents of Divorcing Spouses - N.J. Stat.
Ann. §2A:34-23 provides that in determining equitable distribution, any
property acquired during the marriage by either party by way of gift, devise or
intestate succession shall not be considered. Nevertheless, the receipt of a
gift, devise or bequest can result in a change of circumstances justifying a
reduction of alimony payable by the non-inheriting spouse, (42) or an increase in alimony payable by the inheriting spouse. (43) Thus, parents of a divorcing child may wish to revise their estate plan to provide that any distributions to the child shall instead be held in trust for the benefit of the child with the
independent trustee having powers to make distributions to the child (or
grandchildren) in the trustee's sole discretion.
G. Liquidity Problems. What happens in the event that a testator
revises their will to disinherit a spouse and leaves their entire estate to the
testator's children and then the testator dies? To the extent that the estate is
in excess of $675,000, an estate tax will be payable. How much tax is payable
depends upon the extent to which the estate exceeds $675,000? For example,
an estate of $1,000,000 will result in estate taxes of approximately $130,000; an
estate of $2,000,000 will result in estate taxes of approximately $550,000. (44) This
tax is generally due within 9 months after death. (45) How is it paid? Generally,
the estate will be required to liquidate assets to pay the taxes. (46) What if the
estate consists mostly of retirement benefits the distribution of which can be
delayed over the lifetime of the beneficiary? (47) If the retirement benefits are the
only asset to use, the funds must be removed from the retirement plan,
resulting in the acceleration of income taxes. This is less than ideal. What if
the estate consists of a closely held business? While there is some relief in the
form of a deferral on payment of the estate tax, (48) the business may ultimately
be required to be sold to pay the taxes.
Perhaps the testator should consider purchasing life insurance to pay
the estate taxes. If the life insurance is purchased through an irrevocable life
insurance trust, the proceeds may be estate and income tax free and the
proceeds can be used to pay the estate taxes, thus permitting the continued
deferral of the retirement benefits and eliminating the need to sell any other
assets to pay the taxes. (49)
H. Alimony Trusts. How do you protect a recipient spouse's interest
in alimony payments where the assets of the obligor spouse could be
jeopardized in the future, or if the alimony recipient is financially
unsophisticated? How do you address the situation where the spouses want to
cut all ties to each other by payment "up front" of alimony? One way is
through the use of a Section 682 Trust (so-called as the treatment of this trust
for tax purposes is governed by 26 U.S.C. §682 of the Internal Revenue Code. (50)
The trust is established by the transfer of cash, investment assets or
business assets from the obligor spouse to the trustee of the trust. The trust
provides that the income from the trust is payable to the obligee spouse in
satisfaction of alimony and/or support obligations. Absent Section 682, the
obligor spouse would be taxable on all of the trust income, rather than the
obligee spouse. Section 682, however, is a special fiduciary income tax
provision governing the taxation of distributions from such trusts to legally
separated and divorced spouses. It provides that the recipient spouse shall
include in gross income any income (other than income constituting child
support) to which the recipient spouse is entitled and which, but for Section
682, would be includible in the income of the obligor. Section 682 does not shift
the income tax burden for income distributed in satisfaction of the obligor's
support obligations; the obligor is still required to pay the tax on such income.
If the trust income in a particular tax year is insufficient to make required
distributions of both spousal and child support, income distributions are
deemed to be applied first to child support.
III. It's Over! Issues to Address After a Divorce Judgment is Entered
A. Revise all Beneficiary Designations - As stated above certain
assets do not pass pursuant to the terms of a Last Will and Testament (i.e. life
insurance, retirement plans, IRAs). Thus, simply changing the will to provide
that these benefits go to somebody other than the surviving spouse, without
also changing the beneficiary designation, will not work. Thus, it is imperative
that a newly divorced spouse revises all of the beneficiary designation forms to
remove the ex-spouse as the beneficiary.
B. What happens if the beneficiary designations are not changed and
the owner spouse dies? N.J. Stat. Ann. §3B:3-14 removes the ex-spouse as a
beneficiary of a will after divorce but it does not provide the same treatment
with respect to other testamentary devices. Thus, it would appear that the
failure to revise the beneficiary designations would result in the ex-spouse
being entitled to such benefits. This was the case in Vasconi v. Guardian Life
Insurance Company. (51)
In Vasconi, a property settlement agreement entered into by the
decedent and his former spouse, that was subsequently incorporated into a
Final Judgment of Divorce, provided for a mutual waiver of alimony and a
mutual waiver of all claims or obligations either may have had to the other
arising out of the marital relationship. The agreement further provided for a
relinquishment of all claims either may have had in the estate of the other party
on the latter's death. Approximately 1 ½ years after the judgment of divorce,
the husband died without changing the beneficiary designation on his life
insurance policy. Since there was no formal written change of beneficiary, the
trial court and Appellate Division held that the former wife was entitled to the
death benefit. Relying upon the ruling in Carr v. Carr, the Supreme Court
reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the matter to the trial court to
determine whether the decedent intended to keep his former spouse as the
beneficiary of the policy.
Notwithstanding the holding in Vasconi, matrimonial attorneys should
consider advising their clients after a final judgment is issued, to revise all
beneficiary designations and consider consulting with a Trust and Estates
Attorney. Additionally, matrimonial attorneys might also be wise to consider
adding specific language to property settlement agreements to provide that
each party intends to remove the other as beneficiary of all life insurance
policies, IRAs, retirement plans, etc.
In Groh v. Groh, (52) the Court refused to extend the holding in Carr v. Carr
to ERISA qualified plans, holding that federal law pre-empts state law and,
thus, prohibits the Court from requiring the distribution of the death benefits
from the plan to anyone other than the surviving spouse.
We hope that this article makes you stop and think about creative
approaches to a client's matrimonial situation - and urges you to look
beyond the obvious issues during those first meetings with a potential
client. And never underestimate the impact, and benefit, of estate planning!
Patricia M. Barbarito is a partner with the Morris County law firm of Einhorn, Harris,
Ascher, Barbarito, Frost & Ironson, where she practices family law in the firms' nine lawyer
family law department. Ms. Barbarito is a former Chair of the Family Law Section New Jersey
State Bar Association; Certified Matrimonial Attorney; and on the Board of Managers of the
American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys.
Gary R. Botwinick is counsel to the firm. Mr. Botwinick chairs the firms Trusts and
Estates/Taxation practice group. He has lectured on various topics regarding estate planning
and taxation. He was formerly an attorney with the Manhattan District Counsel Office of the
Internal Revenue Service and received his LL.M. in Taxation from New York University. He is a
member of the Northern New Jersey Estate Planning Council and the Professional Advisory
Committee of the Jewish Community Foundation of Metrowest.
TOP
NOTES
1. N.J. Stat. Ann. §37:2-31 et seq. sets forth the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act. A
premarital agreement is defined as "an agreement between prospective spouses made in
contemplation of marriage to be effective upon marriage." The Act requires the agreement to
be signed by both parties, and have a statement of assets attached. See also DeLorean v.
DeLorean, 211 N.J. Super. 432 (Ch. Div. 1986); D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 200 N.J. Super. 361 (App.
Div. 1985); Marschall v. Marschall, 195 N.J. Super. 16 (Ch. Div. 1984).
2. See Pacelli v. Pacelli, 319 N.J. Super. 185 (App.Div. 1999) cert. denied 161 N.J. 147
(1999). In this case, the Appellate Division discusses the enforceability of a "mid-marriage"
agreement. This is distinguished from a reconciliation agreement, which the courts have
held enforceable if fair and equitable. Id. at 191. In either situation, clearly it is anticipated
that both parties will participate in negotiations before entering into an agreement that will
have a significant impact upon their economic future.
3. See Nicholson v. Nicholson, 199 N.J. Super. 525 (App. Div. 1985) for a discussion of
factors to be considered by the Court when evaluating the validity of a reconciliation
agreement.
4. See Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980); Petersen v. Petersen, 85 N.J. 638 (1981);
Schlemm v. Schlemm, 31 N.J. 557 (1960), addressing the issue of the enforceability of an
agreement entered into at the end of a marriage and fixing the respective parties' rights upon
entry of a final judgment of divorce.
5. "The first pleading of each party shall have annexed thereto an affidavit listing all
known insurance coverage of the parties and their minor children, including but not limited to
life, health, automobile, and homeowner's insurance. The affidavit shall specify the name of
the insurance company, the policy number, the named insured and, if applicable, other
persons covered by the policy; a description of the coverage including the policy term, if
applicable; and in the case of life insurance, an identification of the named beneficiaries. The
affidavit shall also specify whether any insurance coverage was canceled or modified within
the ninety days preceding its date and, if so, a description of the canceled insurance
coverage. Insurance coverage identified in the affidavit shall be maintained pending further
order of the court." New Jersey Court Rule 5:4-2(f), effective April 5, 1999.
6. In the alternative, if the funds were distributed outright to the minor child, the
decedent's ex-spouse might ultimately benefit from these monies in the event that the child
dies before reaching the age of majority (See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:3-1, providing that a minor
cannot make a will, and N.J. Stat. Ann. §3B:5-4(b), providing that the intestate estate of a
decedent belongs to a surviving parent where there are no surviving spouse or children).
7. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §46:2B-8, et seq.
8. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§46:2B-13 - 46:2B-14.
9. See 26 U.S.C. §§401(a)(9); 402(c)(9); 408(a)(6).
10. See 26 U.S.C. §401(a)(9)(B).
11. ERISA is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 839 (1974). It governs the administration of most private pension and benefit plans.
REA is the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984). It creates a
substantive property right for the spouses (male or female) of all plan participants by adding
the concept of an automatic pre-retirement survivor benefit, which the participant's spouse
has an absolute right to receive unless waived in writing. REA also prohibits a participant
from naming anyone other than his or her spouse as a beneficiary of a qualified retirement
plan without written spousal consent.
12. N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:34-23.
13. 212 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 1986).
14. Id. at 568.
15. N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:34-23.1(i).
16. These gifts may qualify as "annual exclusion gifts" as discussed below.
17. 255 N. J. Super. 500 (App. Div. 1992).
18. Id. at 506.
19. Id. at 507.
20. N.J. Stat. Ann. §3B:8-1.
21. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§3B:8-3; 3B:8-6.
22. N.J. Stat. Ann. §3B:8-5.
23. N.J. Stat. Ann. §3B:8-18. See also Estate of Cole, 200 N.J. Super. 396 (Ch. Div. 1984).
24. 26 U.S.C. §§2001; 2010; 2012.
25. 26 U.S.C. §2513.
26. 26 U.S.C. §2503(b).
27. N.J. Stat. Ann. §3B:5-3.
28. 120 N.J. 336 (1990).
29. Carr v. Carr, 229 N.J. Super. 370 (App. Div. 1988).
30. Carr v. Carr, 114 N.J. 520 (1989).
31. Carr v Carr , 120 N.J. at 342.
32. Id. at 344.
33. Id. at 346, n.2.
34. Id. at 351.
35. "In case of the death of the parent to whom the care and custody of the minor
children shall have been awarded by the Superior Court, or in the case of the death of the
parent in whose custody the children actually are, when the parents have been living separate
and no award as to the custody of such children has been made, the care and custody of such
minor children shall not revert to the surviving parent without an order or judgment of the
Superior Court to that effect. The Superior Court shall have the right, in an action brought by a
guardian ad litem on behalf of the children, to appoint such friend or other suitable person,
guardian of such minor children, and shall have the right to remove such guardian, and to
appoint a new guardian or guardians, and to make such judgments and orders, from time to
time, as the circumstances of the case and the benefit of the children shall require." N.J. Stat.
Ann. §9:2-5.
36. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §3B:8-1, et seq.
37. There is an unlimited marital deduction from the gross estate for federal estate tax
purposes which ultimately provides that there will be no estate tax attributable to bequests to
a surviving spouse. See 26 U.S.C. §2056.
38. See 26 U.S.C. §2056(b)(7).
39. See 26 U.S.C. §2056(b)(7).
40. See 26 U.S.C. §2056(b)(7)(B)(ii).
41. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §3B:8-17.
42. See Aronson v. Aronson, 245 N.J. Super. 354 (App. Div. 1991); Miller v. Miller, 160
N.J. 408 (1999).
43. See Stiffler v. Stiffler, 304 N.J. Super. 96 (Ch. Div. 1997).
44. See 26 U.S.C. §2001.
45. 26 U.S.C. §6075(a).
46. The estate tax is payable by the executor. 26 U.S.C. §2002.
47. See 26 U.S.C. §401(a)(9).
48. See 26 U.S.C. §2057.
49. An Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust is designed to own and hold a life insurance
policy until the death of the insured. Since the insured is not the owner of the policy at the
time of his or her death, the death benefit will not be includible in his or her taxable estate.
Thus, by transferring ownership of the policy to the trust, significant estate benefits may be
achieved. See 26 U.S.C. §§2033; 2035; 2041.
50. "There shall be included in the gross income of a wife who is divorced or legally
separated under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance (or who is separated from her
husband under a written separation agreement) the amount of the income of any trust which
such wife is entitled to receive and which, except for this section, would be includible in the
gross income of her husband, and such amount shall not, despite any other provision of this
subtitle, be includible in the gross income of such husband. This subsection shall not apply to
that part of any such income of the trust which the terms of the decree, written separation
agreement, or trust instrument fix, in terms of an amount of money or a portion of such
income, as a sum which is payable for the support of minor children of such husband. In case
such income is less than the amount specified in the decree, agreement, or instrument, for the
purpose of applying the preceding sentence, such income, to the extent of such sum payable
for such support, shall be considered a payment for such support." 26 U.S.C. §682.
51. 124 N.J. 338 (1991).
52. 288 N.J. Super. 321 (Ch. Div. 1995).
TOP
Reprinted from the 2000 Family Law Symposium material with permission of ICLE.
This article may not be republished without express permission of the authors.
Opinions expressed in this article are not intended to be a substitute for specific individual legal advice.
|